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Abstract
The concept of state capacity has been in development literature for decades.Nevertheless the concept, its operationalization, and its measurement are stillhighly contested. This paper seeks to briefly review the literature on statecapacity and provide an empirical analysis of recent data in order to re­assessthe state of capacity theory and testing. We argue that very little, if any,attention has been paid to critical variations in national regional and sub­national levels in state service provision, both statically and over time. We alsoargue that existing theoretical research in capacity utilization can provideinsights to state building and development scholars regarding who is “doingmore with less”. Finally, we offer the concept of durable capacity as a way ofunderstanding how states can provide long­standing development outcomesdespite income variations.
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Resumen
El concepto de capacidad del estado ha sido desarrollado en la literaturadurante décadas. A pesar de esto, el concepto, su operacionalización y sumedida aún son muy discutidos. Este artículo revisa el concepto de capacidaddel estado y proporciona un análisis empírico de datos recientes a fin dereformular la teorización y la medida de la capacidad del estado. En el mismoargumentamos que se ha prestado muy poca atención, si es que se ha prestadoalguna, a los puntos de inflexión críticos en los cambios nacionales, regionalesy subnacionales en cuanto a provisión de servicios por parte del estado, tantoestadísticamente como con el paso del tiempo. Este trabajo es el primero enexaminar a nivel nacional y subnacional, la capacidad como una variación en laprovisión de servicios.
Palabras clave: capacidad del estado, poder del estado, fortaleza del estado,construcción del estado
132
he concept of state capacity has existed in development literaturefor decades. Development practitioners have declared capacitydevelopment a fundamental project. It served as a key topic atthe High Level Forums held by the OECD in Paris in 2006 and Accra in2008 and the G8 summit in Geneagles in 2005. As stated by the OECD(2006): “...capacity development is a fundamental component ofdevelopment and aid effectiveness and a key element in achieving theMillennium Development Goals (MDGs)” (p. 3). Further, “Adequatecountry capacity is one of the critical missing factors in current effortsto meet the Millennium Development Goals (MGDs)” (p. 7). Academicsin politics, comparative history, and sociology have acknowledged theimportance of understanding capacity as well. The literatures on statecapacity and its related concepts are vast. We can point to two recentpublications, a special issue of Studies in Comparative International
Development dedicated to infrastructural power (for the editorialintroduction, see Soifer & Hau, 2008), and the extended exchangebetween the developers of the World Bank’s World DevelopmentIndicators and its critics in the Journal of Politics (see Kaufmann,Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007a, 2007b; Kurtz & Schrank, 2007a, 2007b) asindicators of the importance of the concept and its measurement to theacademic community. Surprisingly, there has been limited work on developing a coherentand empirically verifiable concept that can receive broad support. Evenafter significant time and empirical research there remain competingdefinitions, competing hypotheses, and competing methods ofmeasurement. The positive outcome of this healthy debate is theassurance that the concepts of state capacity and state strength remain animportant and critical to academics in comparative politics andpractitioners of development. However, without further theoretical andempirical development, capacity will cease to be a productive concept(for an argument that the capacity concept has already ceased to beproductive, see Kocher, 2010). The role of the state in development outcomes is widely accepted(Evans, 1995; Kohli, 2004; Przeworski, 1990). The coordination andresources needed to enact widespread improvements in the quality oflife and sustained economic growth have been widely viewed as best
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met through the role of the developmental state. While there arearguments for the role of free trade to promote economic development,the inability of free markets to limit concomitant inequality with growthand the limits of free markets to provide social development havebrought us back to the need of the state to be a key agent ofdevelopment (Collier, 2007; Stiglitz, 2003). Nevertheless, the state is apolitical entity and thus has interests of its own separate from theinterests of the citizens over which it presides. Further, the state mustcope with conflicts inherent in a complex organization that seeks tomaintain itself over time. This says nothing of the changing character ofthe state and expectations that citizens have of the role of state and whatit should and should not do. The concept of state capacity is tied to the relatively modernunderstanding that the state is, at least in part if not fundamentally,responsible for the well­being, economic status, and social developmentof its citizens. This is to say that a modern citizen now expects morefrom its state that citizens of times past. While not analyzed extensivelyin this paper, what this means for the theoretical understanding of statecapacity is that we must ask the questions: State capacity to do what and
for whom? To answer the first question, this paper is based on theassumption that the states analyzed are interested in providing basicservices to their people as defined by the United Nations’ MillenniumDevelopment Goals (UN, 2000). The data analyzed in this paper do notallow us to answer the second question of for whom? Nevertheless, wewould argue that in most cases states provide services to the populationat differential rates, and those differences can be detected and related toa host of other factors. We will discuss these questions at the conclusionof the paper. This paper seeks to make a comprehensive analysis and evaluation ofthe concept of capacity, highlighting its varied use in the literature bothconceptually and empirically. After reviewing the theoretical variationsof the concept, we use an empirical analysis to highlight conceptual andmeasurement problems of capacity. Our theoretical and empiricalreview leads us to believe that the future of empirical analysis of thedevelopmental state will require case­based research that accounts forregional and historical contextualization. Particular attention must be
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paid to theoretical definitions and empirical operationalizations thatdifferentiate capacity vs. utilization and differentiate the inputs from theoutputs.
Political and sociological literature discussing the state regularly usesthe concept “state capacity” and related terminology and ideas, such as“power,” “state strength,” and “institutions.” The notion of statecapacity in its various forms has existed for decades and was an elementof much of 19th and 20th century German social theory, but it became aregular part of developmental literature only in the 1980s. Despite thislong history, or perhaps because of it, competing definitions of capacityabound, muddying the theoretical waters. Multiple meanings havedeveloped because of the concept's use across varied disciplines,including politics, history, sociology, and economics, not to mention itsuse in applied development policy. The capacity concept is also usedacross a variety of cases and levels of analysis, further adding to varietyof meanings. The lack of a coherent, consensual definition is evident ineven a cursory review of the literature. What follows is a summary ofmajor theoretical orientations in the capacity literature and exampleempirical studies following from those orientations. These orientationsand historical and quantitative examples are summarized in the tablebelow. (For a similar summary of capacity literature grounded insecurity and conflict studies, see Kocher, 2010). Early capacity concepts were rooted in a fundamental conflictbetween the state and civil society. Capacity theories that argue for stateautonomy or for state power view capacity through the lens of stateagainst civil society or state against civil society and other states. Othertheories have not viewed state capacity as a function of conflict, butinstead see capacity as a function of policy. These theories see statecapacity through the lens of policy preferences, decision­making, andimplementation, with an emphasis on technocratic competence. Whilethe earlier, state­society oriented definitions of capacity lend themselveswell to national and cross­national analysis and comparisons, the policy­
Enriquez & Centeno - State Capacity134
What is Capacity?
oriented definitions lend themselves to national and sub­nationalanalysis and comparisons. We provide a brief account of these variousconcepts along with empirical examples that utilize quantitative data orhistorical comparative illustrations. Weberian notions of autonomy and bureaucracy informed earlydefinitions of state capacity. Skocpol and Finegold (1982) have arguedthat state strength comes from autonomy from civil society and itspower holders. Later, Skocpol developed the Weberian concept of thestate further to argue that state capacity is a function of state autonomy,integrity, bureaucratic refinement, and resources (Skocpol, 1985). Whileother definitions of capacity have come to dominate thinking (seebelow), state autonomy nevertheless remains a part of theoretical andempirical work. Examples of empirical work following the concept ofstate strength as state autonomy include Skocpol and Finegold's (1982)historical account of New Deal­era federal economic interventions inindustry and agriculture and Doner’s (1992) study of Southeast Asianauto industry development. Capacity as autonomy has been challenged primarily throughvariations on the concept of capacity as power. Migdal (1988) definedcapacity as “the ability of state leaders to use the agencies of the state toget people in the society to do what they want them to do” (p. xiii). Thiswas taken to an international level by Kugler and Domke (1986), whodefined power in international politics as “the ability of one nation toexercise control over the behavior or fate of another” (p. 39). Thesedefinitions are essentially Dahl’s (1957) concept of power used in state­society level terms rather than at the individual level of analysis. Thus,the developments and criticisms of the concept of power stemming fromthis tradition can be applied here (see, for example, Bachrach & Baratz,1975; Lukes, 2004). In addition to Kugler and Domke's (1986) study ofwar­time capacities, a fascinating application of this approach can befound in Gaventa's (1980) historical study of Appalachian miners andcoal companies and unions. Another line of theorizing in capacity literature has focused on thescope or range of a state’s power. Mann (1984) argued that “despoticpower” is “the range of actions which the elite is empowered toundertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil
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society groups” (p. 188). Here, range is curtailed by civil society. Analternative take on scope is exemplified by Fukuyama (2004), whoargues that scope “refers to the different functions and goals taken on bythe government” (p. 7). That is, the scope of a state’s power is, at leastin part, a decision made by the state itself. Thus redistributive activitiesof the state, such as welfare programs, are variations in chosen scoperather than capacity itself. The notion of range, similar to autonomy andpower, focuses on the negotiations within the state and between it andother actors regarding level, type, and form of intervention in society. Exploiting the distinction between capacity and scope, Centeno andPortes (2006) focus their attention on the interaction between thetwo—what they call “regulatory intent”. The results of state policieswill be a product of both what state seek to accomplish (scope) and whatthey are able to implement (capacity). For them, the critical theoreticalcategory is that of the “frustrated state”: those wishing to impose muchgreater control over a society than they are organizationally capable ofdoing so. Other definitions have taken a narrower approach, arguing thatcapacity is the ability of the state to form a policy decision andimplement it. An example comes from Mann (1984), who definedinfrastructural power as “the capacity of the state to actually penetratecivil society, and to implement logistically political decisionsthroughout the realm” (p. 189). This is a significant conceptualnarrowing. Similarly, Fukuyama (2004), defines capacity as “the abilityof states to plan and execute policies and to enforce laws cleanly andtransparently” (p. 4). An example of empirical research in this line ofcapacity concept includes Geddes ([1994] 1996) study of politicians andpolicy in Latin America. Note above that Fukuyama adds the normative qualifiers that stateactions should be carried out “cleanly”. This normative approach is onewhich is common in development practitioner literature. We argue thatcapacity is not and should not be a normative concept. That is, whethera state uses its capacity to enact policy preferences for “good” or “bad”ends does not negate the empirical reality of that state’s ability.Historical examples of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany during theWorld Wars are obvious examples of states with significant capacity (in
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any of the above conceptions) which was used in morally deplorableways. We add here that the study of political elite decision­making is anunderstudied area, even as it is pointed to as important in the literature.Geddes ([1994] 1996) argues, “If one wants to explain a state’spreferences regarding development strategies, for example, one needs toknow who has power and what they want and believe” p. (6). Despitethis insight, elite decision­making in the developing world is still aneglected area of study. Finally, capacity is often been understood in a dual relationship towealth: both how much wealth a polity produces (GDP) and how muchof that wealth can be extracted by the state (taxation). State capacity as afunction of wealth (and wealth extraction) was formalized theoreticallyand historically for Western countries by Tilly (1985). The influence ofthis idea, even if limited to state intervention and developmentliterature, is difficult to overstate. Theoretical development of the idea isdemonstrated by Levi (1988). Recent empirical studies directly relatedto capacity and taxation include Besley and Perrson (2009). Empiricalstudies using taxation as a measurement of capacity are myriad (anexample includes Shen & Williamson, 1997). Nevertheless, theassociation between state strength (and state building) with wealth andwealth extraction is not without problems. Undoubtedly wealth of a country (GDP) and access to that wealth bythe state (taxation) are major components of a state's ability to developin ways that are important in the context of state building. That said,GDP and taxation have come to be seen as “best measures” of capacity.We argue that this is problematic for three reasons. First, focusing onwealth of a country limits the capacity concept in unnecessary ways. Itleads to emphasis of classic Western industrial meanings ofdevelopment, which may not be the best means of state building in non­Western developing countries. Second, despite the arguments presentedby Levi (1988), variations in taxation levels are not explained wellsimply by a concept of “capacity”. It is clear that among developing anddeveloped countries, the variations in taxation are as much about acomplex understanding of national history as an understanding ofcapacity, however defined. Finally, we want to further the idea that
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development and state building can occur at many points on theGDP/taxation curves. Wealth itself is not enough of an explanation; wewant to understand the variations in development that are occurring atsimilar income levels.
There are a number of continuing problems that are raised in this reviewof the concept of capacity. First is the potentially devastating threat oftautology that permeates so much work on capacity and strength. Forexample, Huber (1995) argues that a primary goal of states isenforcement of rule of law, while also arguing that rule of law is anecessary but not sufficient component of the achievement of othergoals. Here she has already blurred the line between inputs, goals, andthe ability to transform one into the other. The threat of tautology creepsin particularly during attempts to operationalize the concept forempirical work. It is simple enough to conceive of capacity as variable,with states having more or less capacity at any given time in any givenarea. However, upon measurement, often the concepts and variables that
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Capacity Concept
Shen and Williamson (1997),Besley and Perrson (2009)
Source Empirical Examples
Autonomy Skocpol (1985) Skocpol and Finegold (1982),Doner (1992)
Power Mann (1984), Migdal(1988) Kugler and Domke (1986)Scope Mann (1984), Centenoand Portes (2006) Geddes (1994)Mann (1984), Fukuyama(2004)Policy Decisions/Implementation
Wealth (GDP/Taxation) Tilly (1985), Levi (1988)
Table 1.
Summary and Capacity Concepts, Sources, and Empirical Examples
Complicating the Capacity Concept
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are used to define capacity (institutions, bureaucracy, infrastructure) arethe very same concepts and variables used to determine the outcomes ofcapacity. How does one separate the measurement of capacity from themeasurement of the results of capacity? Related, there is inherent in observational measurements of capacitythe problem of sampling on the dependent variable. That is, the verystates that are at a minimum level of capacity survive to be measuredand have the ability to measure themselves (for example, providestatistics on mortality and literacy). Indeed, perhaps an underutilized“measure” of capacity is simply a dichotomous measurement of whetherthe data exists for a particular variable. One relatively simple strategy inthis line might be to measure the regularity with which statistical digestsand the like are produced. A third issue, and completely ignored in the literature, is the variationin results which simply reflect the variation in ideological priorities ofdifferent cultures and social groups. For example, rates of femaleliteracy may reflect capacity to educate a population, but also the extentto which parts of a society oppose such efforts, the strength of theirresistance, and dispersion of population which might limit the reach ofuniversal education. More importantly, measures of results fail todifferentiate between the capacity of the state to implement policies, thelegitimacy of these policies, the capacity of a society to resistimplementation, and the simple natural obstacles involved. We arguethat only qualitative and historical work can fully address these sourcesof variation in capacity.
The problems of measuring capacity come from two areas in particular.The greatest source of measurement problems stem from the theoreticalproblems of capacity. Because the concept of capacity has yet to be fullydeveloped, it is no surprise that operationalization and measurement ofthe concept have also yet to be convincingly developed. For example,the most common measure of capacity is tax revenue, though it issometimes considered a measure of capacity (for example, Kugler &Arbetman, 1997; Kugler & Domke, 1986; Shen & Williamson, 1997;
International andMultidisciplinary Journal ofSocial Sciences 1(2) 139
The Problem ofMeasurement
Tilly, 1992) and other times a measure of scope (for example,Fukuyama, 2004). Competing definitions and understandings of the concept have led tocompeting measures. For example, Geddes ([1994] 1996) argues thatthe ability to tax and coerce private actors depends on the existence ofeffective bureaucratic organizations (p. 14). Therefore, sheconceptualizes capacity indirectly through bureaucratic autonomy andorganization, operationalized as votes by party and seats in thelegislature. Alternatively, Doner (1992) follows in the tradition ofSkocpol (1985; & Finegold, 1982) and operationalizes capacity basedon the state’s autonomy from civil society. Capacity is often measuredthrough composite scores and indices, assuming that a complex offactors combine in a particular way to indicate state capacity. Fromthese assumptions come measures of human development (the UN’sHuman Development Index (HDI)), competitiveness (the WorldEconomic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index), and governance (theWorld Bank’s Governance Indicators). An interesting critique andresponse exchange on the World Bank governance measures waspublished in the May 2007 issue of The Journal of Politics (Kurtz &Schrank, 2007b; Kaufmann et al., 2007c; Kurtz & Schrank, 2007a;Kaufmann et al., 2007b). Clearly a lack of concept development andconsensus has led to a wide variety of measures which often point inconflicting directions. A second source of measurement problems is data quality, which hasproved to be a hindering factor in analysis. Data quality is threatened byboth availability and objectiveness. Even when an operationalization hasbeen decided upon, such as tax revenue as a percent of GDP or policeforce as percent of the population, there is a disappointing lack of dataavailable. In our review of 45 variables related to capacity for this paper,18 out of 45 (40%) developing countries were missing 5 or morevariables; 5 countries were missing more than 10 variables, includingSaudi Arabia (missing 17), United Arab Emirates (15), and China (13).Particularly in areas of governance and labor, such as voter turnout,what information that is reported is of questionable objectivity. Forexample, reports of voting age population turnout for the most recentnational election met or exceeded the voting age population count inAngola (121%), Rwanda (93.6%), and Vietnam (101%).
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One way to begin to overcome these theoretical and methodologicalproblems is to rigorously attend to the separation of inputs andoutcomes and the transformations from one to the other. We suggest thatthe applied economics literature has already developed a rich theoreticaland empirical literature from which we can learn. This literaturesurrounds the concept of capacity utilization. Capacity utilization was introduced early in the 20th century as part ofeconomic studies of industrial output in the United States. Theoreticalissues and measurements were discussed by Klein (1960) and Klein andPreston (1967). Morrison (1992) has provided a solid overview of boththe theory and its many measurement variations. Berndt and Hesse(1986) have demonstrated that the capacity utilization can be used as acomparative international measure. Lessons to be learned from this literature that can be incorporated intofuture refinement of the capacity concept fall into both theoretical andmeasurement areas. Theoretically, the basic distinction between capacityand capacity utilization is critical. In the economic literature, capacityutilization is defined as “a ratio of the actual level of output to asustainable maximum level of output, or capacity” (Corrado & Mattey,1997, p. 152). Capacity utilization is often expressed as u = Y/Y*, where
u is capacity utilization, Y is a measure of maximal capacity, and Y* issome measure of actual capacity output. Capacity is, at its heart, often a latent variable (Kugler & Domke,1986). It is understood in the econometric literature that full utilizationof capacity is the goal, though not often the outcome. They are carefulto distinguish in their measures what is actual capacity vs. what is
maximal or optimal capacity. It is the ratio of the two that is utilization.We would do well to consider in our theories of capacity how we candistinguish best between optimal capacity, actual capacity, and to beclear that what we are currently measuring is often utilization ratherthan capacity itself. Further, the distinction between inputs and outputs has been madevery clear in the capacity utilization literature. For example Klein(1960) measured output as a function of labor input and capital stock
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Capacity vs. Utilization
(p. 274). Even if measured dynamically as flows of labor and capitalstock, outputs are still distinct from these inputs. Strong separation ofinputs and outputs should be a goal of capacity studies. Another important contribution is the understanding of short­run vs.long­run outputs and their relationship to measurement (see, forexample, Berndt & Hesse, 1986). Short­run capacity is distinct fromlong­run capacity, thus measurement of these two concepts should alsobe distinct. Cross­sectional data captures short­run capacity. Long­runcapacity, the ability of a plant or a country to sustain a given output(outcome) can be capture only through panel (repeated­measures) data.This seemingly basic measurement fact has rarely, if ever, beenemployed in empirical studies of state capacity. The applied economic literature has worked hard to overcome theinherent difficulties of measurement of both total capacity and actualcapacity. Academics concerned with capacity would do well to visit thisliterature. The industrial economic community has developed long­running surveys of firms and individual plants which use individualexpert responses to determine what maximal output and actual outputare. Data quality and proxy measures have certainly been at the fore ofeconometric literature, and it is foolish to ignore the advances made inthe economic community to overcome these problems.
One of our central concerns with measures of state capacity is that theytend to reflect performance or delivery of service. In and of itself thisshould not be a problem, except when such indicators do not accuratelyreflect the institutional capacity of the state, but extraneous factors suchas policy preferences or societal responses. We are particularlyconcerned with measures of state capacity that essentially mirror wealth.That richer states may be better able to deliver better services thanpoorer ones should come as no surprise. We contend that in the case ofhigh correlations with wealth, these indicators might be of limited valueas they do not provide any insight into the relative capacity of the stateto work with the resources at hand. Obviously, these relationships mightalso reflect the positive effect of state capacity on development, but in
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The Problem ofWealth
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the absence of careful longitudinal study, comparative statistics mightalso be susceptible to spuriousness. Perhaps the most egregious case of this is the infrastructural indexprovided by the World Economic Forum which is significantlycorrelated with all measures of wealth from total GDP (0.78) to eithermeasure of per capita income (0.74 and 0.53). This statisticalrelationship leads us to question the utility of depending too much onreputational surveys where respondents are asked to rate the quality oftheir governmental services with an appropriate comparative context.When the sample is drawn from a sector of the population that has hadaccess to the quality of services (in this case, infrastructure) of thedeveloped world, the responses are even more problematic. Why wouldwe expect a middle­income state to have the same level of highways asthe wealthy, no matter the quality of governance? Similarly, where wefind relatively strong correlation between World Bank Indicators andGDP per capita, both as measured in US dollars (USD) (0.57 to 0.62) orin PPP (from 0.64 to 0.68) as well with HDI (0.53 to 0.62). Again, insuch instances, what appear to be relatively effective states may simplybe rich enough as to allow an element of inefficacy while stillperforming at acceptable levels. Another possible candidate for measuring state capacity which hasreceived some attention is the informal sector. Both of our measures ofinformality (as reported by the ILO and the OECD) are even morehighly correlated to per capita income (­0.62 and ­0.68 as measured by$US and ­0.74 and ­0.63 by PPP). The relationships here are of coursecomplicated by the fact that poorer economies are more likely togenerate these types of jobs regardless of the capacity of the state toregulate them. Interestingly, we find considerable variation in the extent to whichsome of the individual (and non­reputational) infrastructural measuresare also highly correlated with wealth. On the higher end, delivery ofinfant and maternal health (as measured by mortality rates), water andsanitation infrastructure, and secondary education appear to becorrelated with income (­0.4, ­0.37, 0.40, 0.41, and 0.48 for USD and­0.52, ­0.49, 0.5, 0.53, and 0.62 for PPP respectively). Note that suchlevels would still indicate considerable analytical space for theimportance of institutional capacity in determining delivery of services.
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The much lower level of correlation with primary enrollment (0.22 and0.31) indicates that this has become so universally expected of evenrelatively poor societies that variance has declined precipitously (this isalso true of measures such as immunization). Two measures that appear surprisingly free of an income effect arequality of the road network and postal delivery. We suggest that muchmore work could be done on analyzing the institutional bases of thesetwo aspects of good governance. Similarly, voter registration andturnout are uncorrelated with GDP per capita as well as tax revenue as aproportion of GDP. Violence (as measured by the homicide rate) appearsto be also independent of income for this group. Interestingly, we findno immediate relationship between the size of the state (as measured bythe proportion of the population working in the public sector or as thepercentage of government expenditures within GDP). Nor is the state’sextractive capacity, as measured by tax revenue as a percentage of GDPand percentage of the population in the armed forces. Given the importance of comparative wealth in these outcomemeasures, we are particularly interested in identifying those countriesthat do better or worse than might be expected given their incomelevels. That is, controlling for income (but again, not for many of theother possible influencing factors) what states seem to deliver more orless? We may begin with the World Bank indicators. Not surprisinglygiven the high correlation between these measures, the same set ofcountries is found to over and underperform. The star in the formercategory is certainly Chile. South Africa, Malaysia, and the Balticrepublics also perform above the expected income line. Amongunderperformers we find two different set of countries: African statesand those dependent on primary resources. In terms of extractive capacity, we do not find such clear patterns.Obviously, the depth and reach of conscription will be highly correlatedwith geopolitical context and most of the countries with high percentageof the population in the armed forces find themselves in permanentstates of war preparation: the Middle East, Taiwan, and the ROK. Forour measure of tax, complications include differing accounting methodsand levels of extraction responsibility (e.g. national vs. provincial) andthe avail­ability of other sources. Cases of interest here include SouthAfrica, Algeria and Morocco for above the line and Bangladesh and
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Pakistan below it. If we analyze the delivery of a set of governmentservices controlling for income we find two pat­terns. The first is asignificant clustering of cases close to the mean with few if anystandouts for any particular measure. The two exceptions may besecondary enrollment and provision of sanitation where we believe wemay speak of institutional legacies. The best performers in thesemeasures seem linked by the relatively long­term existence of a stateapparatus that built the underlying foundations for service delivery andthis includes the ex­Soviet republics and some of the wealthier LatinAmerican states. The worst performers (and here the variance is muchgreater) seem to be consistently African countries. There has been considerable discussion regarding the link betweenstate capacity and integration with international economy. On the onehand, some argue that the need to produce for an export market wouldlead to a strengthening of the state as it sought to improve both itsinfrastructural base and its native human capital. On the other,discussions of the resource curse would lead us to expect relativelyweak performance as there were few incentives for the state to developinstitutionally given the (relatively) easily available bonanza fromexploiting a primary resource. Surprisingly, our preliminary analysisdoes not support either position. No single measure of state capacity hasa significant correlation with the traditional measures of the phenomenadiscussed above (exports as a percentage of GDP for the first andprimary exports as a percentage of GDP for the second appear tocontribute in any consistent fashion to the delivery of state services.
One of the most disturbing findings in our review of measures ofcapacity is how little any particular measure relates to any other. Ourdata set reviews 80 variables across 45 countries (Centeno, 2012)selected for their status as developing nations of some recognizablecapacity. The country list was selected based on middle rankings ofhuman development, specifically avoiding countries of high income andvery high development and particularly low income and very lowdevelopment. Pairwise correlations of all variables were run in order to
The Multiple Applications of Capacity
account for missing data in the set. There were few significantcorrelations among the variables. Most correlations are below 0.30. Expected significant correlations include The World BankGovernance indicators (effectiveness, rule of law, and control ofcorruption) among each other and between the World Bank GovernanceIndicators and wealth. Total literacy and female literacy are highlycorrelated, as are HDI scores and literacy, infant and maternal mortality,and access to drinking water. These expected and significantcorrelations attest to the accuracy of the data set. However, there are nearly no other statistically significantcorrelations other than those between wealth and human developmentand between wealth and infrastructure. This is in stark contrast to thefindings of Holmberg et al. (2009). Holmberg and colleagues findsignificant correlations between the three World Bank Governanceindicators and societal outcomes. However, it must be pointed out thatthey use a data set that includes up to 180 countries. Given that theirdata set includes the most highly developed countries (and wealthiest)as well as the least highly developed countries (and poorest), there is nodoubt that they would find significant correlations. Our data set analyzesspecifically moderately developing countries, seeking to understandwhy countries of comparable income or historical situation have varyingmeasured outcomes. As has been argued by Migdal et al. (1994), it is critical to understandthat states have greater or lesser capacity across any number of areas.Indeed, much earlier Skocpol and Finegold (1982) argued that theUnited States federal government displayed a particularly strongcapacity to form and implement a development program in agricultureduring the New Deal era, but was incapable of developing andimplementing a similarly successful one in the industrial sector duringthe same period. This is an excellent example of how a particular statecan have varying capabilities across sectors even at the same historicalera at the same level of aggregation. The lack of clustering among theoutcome variables points to the importance of understanding thevariability of capacity within countries and regions. The empiricalevidence suggests that capacity outcomes are generally not inherentlyrelated to each other. Wealth obviously accounts for variation indevelopment. However, accounting for that relationship, there is not
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compelling empirical evidence that strength in a particular sectortranslates necessarily or even easily to strength in another. This fact hasyet to be explored, much less explained.
An interesting problem with capacity is that as it stands, it does notcontextualize outcomes in any way. Examining various measures ofdevelopment by regions shows how important contextualization can be.Our empirical analysis finds important variation across regions andwithin regions, which are both totally obscured by capacity measures asthey are currently used. Further, we find that running simple regressionanalysis on our outcome variables, accounting for regionalizationexplains typically a third or more of the variation. Two examples illustrate the importance of understanding variationacross regions. First, an analysis of access to sanitation as a function ofincome was run. World Bank data was used to plot access to improvedsanitation facilities as a function of GDP/capita in year 2000 USD. Abasic scatter plot of these two variables indicates positive linearrelationship (see Figure 1). If we plot the data with regional indicators,however, it appears that regional grouping is high (see Figure 2). Two separate regressions were run, first with sanitation on incomethen with sanitation on income with regional controls. The regressionestimates indicate that income is a significant positive predictor ofaccess to improved sanitation in both models. However, the R2(goodness of fit estimate) in the first model (without regional controls)is 0.279. That is, income as measured by GDP/capita (USD) aloneexplains 27.9% of the variation in the model. However, includingcontrols for regions increases the goodness of fit further to 0.607.
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The Rule ofThirds: The Importance of Regionalization
Figure 1. % Population with access to improved sanitation by GDP/capita,2000 USD
Figure 2. % Population with access to improved sanitation, regionally markedby GDP/capita, 2000 USD
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
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Incredibly, almost a half of the remaining variation (that is, an additionalthird of total remaining unexplained model variation) is explained byaccounting for region alone (See Table 2 for estimates).
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 2.
Linear regression results for sanitation
(1) (2)
Sanitation Sanitation
GDP/capita (USD, 200) 0.00645 *** 0.00466 ***
(5.72) (5.72)
North Africa 42.53 ***
(4.35)
Latin America 26.84 ***
(4.24)
S/SE/E Asia 19.19 **
(3.10)
Post­Soviet 49.43 ***
(7.66)
East Europe 43.59 ***
(6.15)
Middle East 32.12 ***
(3.44)
Constant 54.05 *** 30.75 ***
(14.88) (6.88)
N 83 83
adj. R2 0.279 0.607
Plotting the regression lines by region highlights the variation across ourdata set (See Figure 3).
 Running similar regression analyses on the outcome variables ofmaternal mortality showed the importance of regionalization to an evengreater degree. The goodness of fit (adjusted R2) score for maternalmortality on GDP par capita (2000 USD) is 0.198. That is, 19.8% of thevariation in outcomes is explained by GDP per capita. However, whenwe control for regional groupings, that goodness of fit score jumps to0.767, or 76.7% (see Table 3). Time and again we found that accounting for regional groupingsimproved our analyses by a third or more. It is clear that accounting forgeographical context is critical to understanding development andcapacity outcomes. We also want to note that this geographicimportance points to the need for historical comparative models andexplanations.
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Figure 3. % Population with access to improved sanitation by region with fittedlines, by GDP/capita, 2000 USD
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
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t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 3.
Regression results for maternal mortality
(1) (2)
Maternal Mortality Maternal Mortality
GDP/capita (USD, 200) ­0.0433 *** ­0.0197 **
(­4.66) (­3.31)
North Africa ­436.3 ***
(­6.93)
Latin America ­424.1 ***
(­10.49)
S/SE/E Asia ­341.4 ***
(­8.40)
Post­Soviet ­530.8 ***
(­12.75)
East Europe ­514.6 ***
(­11.50)
Middle East ­444.2 ***
(­8.10)
Constant 291.3 *** 600.5 ***
(9.20) (20.87)
N 85 85
adj. R2 0.198 0.767
Variation within regions is equally important. Given the shared history,resources, and social and cultural factors of particular regions, basiccapacity measures as they currently stand do not explain within regionvariation. When plotting homicide rates as a function of GDP/capita(2000 USD), it is clear that there are outliers in the data (see Figure 4).
 Plotting the data with regional labels, we see that 1) the outliers arefrom primarily Latin American countries, and 2) what seems to be astrict relationship between income and homicides is actually highlyregionalized (see Figure 5). While the Latin American countries have highly varied GDP percapita numbers there is limited relationship between increase in incomeand decrease in violence (as operationalized as homicide per 100K).Honduras has a GDP per capita (2000 USD) at 1352.79 and very highhomicide levels. Venezuela has considerably higher GDP per capita at5401.02, yet only limited declines in homicide. In a reverse situation,Sub­Saharan Africa clusters strongly around a similarly low GDP per
Within Region Variation: When Money Doesn't Matter
Figure 4. Homicide per 100K by GDP/capita, 2000 USD
Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime
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capita, though there is wide variation among their homicides rates,particularly with South Africa with the highest homicide rates of all. Capacity theory or measures currently do not explain these cross­regional and intra­regional variations. While some regional clustering isto be expected due to contagion effects, the extreme results found in themost basic data analysis are not accounted for by current theory.
We have argued that capacity as a concept has been defined variously inthe literature. Major problems of all definitions have been a lack ofseparation between inputs and outcomes. Further, wealth has been usedas a proxy for capacity to the detriment of other, more robustexplanations, such as regional influence and (relatedly) historicalexplanations. Finally, empirical studies have relied heavily on cross­sectional data, giving virtually no insight into long­run capacities ofstates.
Figure 5. Homicide per 100K by Region by GDP/capita, 2000 USD
Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime
An Empirical Example: Durable Capacities and the Case of
Literacy in the Former Soviet Union
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 Here we present a simple analysis of literacy levels in former SovietUnion (FSU) countries. We use FSU countries from our data set to arguethat a particular capacity outcome, adult (15+) literacy levels of acountry over time, have remained highly stable despite considerablevariation in per capita income both within and across countries. Thisstability points to a high level of capacity by the state to provide (atleast) a basic level of education to its people despite wealth variations.We argue that this can only be explained through historical analysis. Our analysis looks at 13 former Soviet countries: Armenia,Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.The data consist of adult (15+) literacy as reported by the WorldDevelopment Bank between 1985 and 2005. All years that had datawere used. This resulted in at least two data points for all countries,several with at least four. The former Soviet Union countries were chosen to highlight ourgeneral arguments presented thus far. First, it is possible to separateinvestments into development outcomes from the outcomes themselves.Second, wealth does not explain all variation of a particularoutcome—the context of region and history must be employed to fullyunderstand outcomes. Third, these cases highlight the durability ofcapacity investments over time and across wealth variations.  It is well known that the Soviet Union made literacy and broadercultural education a priority during its existence, and this priority wasrealized in a number of investments (inputs) to the goal. Theinvestments included construction of schools throughout the vast realmof the Union, development and publication of standardized learningmaterials, and training and deployment of educators at pre­primary,primary, and vocational levels all over the country. These capital andlabor investments were bolstered by the infamous propaganda machine,inculcating the importance, even the necessity, of literacy and culturalawareness to the ideal Soviet person. The outcome of this investmentwas a skyrocketing literacy level from pre­Soviet to Soviet eras. At thetime of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, our 13 countries showedadult literacy levels of 95% or greater. What cannot be captured by simple cross­sectional data is thatextreme variation in per capita income that the FSU countries have
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experienced, both within their own boarders over the past 25 years andacross the various countries. The graph below (Figure 6) demonstratesthe variation income experienced by these countries. Reviewing thegraphs, two things should become clear. First, there is variation acrosscountries in per capita income. Kazakhstan has had considerably higherincome levels across time than its neighbors Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, andTurkmenistan. Similarly, Russia has had higher income levels that itsneighbor Ukraine. Second, across time, each country has hadconsiderable variation in the 25 years shown in the graphs. The historyof the dissolution of the Soviet Union was also a history of financialcrisis, hyperinflation, and then increasing and steady economicimprovements. This is demonstrated most clearly by countries such asBelarus, Georgia, and Latvia.
Figure 6. Adult literacy and GDP/capita, 2000 USD
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
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 Despite these variations in wealth, both within and across countries,literacy does not decline, and in fact only improves over time. In everycase shown, literacy begins at a high level and maintains or increaseslevels. This demonstrates the durable capacity of education and literacyin these nations. Considerable investment was made during the Sovietera to create education as a cultural norm and to build up infrastructureto educate the ever­increasing millions of Soviets. This capitalinvestment proved to be durable across the various levels of income ofthe member countries during the Soviet era. It also proved to be durableto wealth and social changes after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Although a small number of theorists have called for an understandingof capacity that includes contextualization (Huber, 1995; Migdal, 2001),nothing has been done to fully develop such a theory, and nothing hasbeen done to demonstrate what such a theory would lead to in terms ofempirical research. There are a number of areas that require furtherdevelopment immediately. These include national as well as sub­national comparisons, geographic and regional variations, and historiccontextualization. Most needed is serious attention to historical casestudies based on empirical data from a number of years, regions, andlevels of aggregation. Both the theoretical and empirical issues of state capacity point outthe difficulties of exploring what remain institutional “black boxes.”Social science has been very successful in measuring and analyzing theresults of state policies such as stages of development, degrees ofdemocracy, and levels of human welfare. We know much less aboutwhat goes on inside the states. This is particularly true of sub­elitepractices. For example, we certainly know much more about thetechnocrats of central banks and finance ministries than about revenuecollectors in the provinces. Studies of the professionalism and skills ofcivil service tend to be country specific and, apart from thegroundbreaking study by Evans and Rauch (1999), we have little byway of concrete measures or indices across enough cases for meaningfulcomparative analysis.
Capacity as a Relational / Contextualized Concept
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 We need to specify the geographical diffusion of both state intentionsand implementations. With regards the first, some states may be onlyconcerned with policies in particular locales (e.g. major cities) or sectors(taxation or conscription vs. economic development). Similarly, theauthority of a state maybe geographically bounded. In the most extremecases, state authority may be limited to a few blocks around apresidential palace. In some circumstances, intention andimplementation combine to limit the reach of a state. So, for example,the apartheid South African state was much more concerned and capableof dealing with criminal activity in white areas than in those defined as“African.” In general, we might say that uniformity of reach may be anexcellent measure of general state capacity. Finally, no analyses we have seen account for historical variations incapacity, either within a particular country over time or across a numberof countries over time. This lack of inclusion of history in basicassessments cannot be overlooked. Simple single figures, such as annualrate of growth can be included in analyses to exploit changes over time.For example, the World Bank’s Governance Effectiveness scorecorrelates highly with GDP/capita (PPP) in our data set at 0.684 (atgreater than 0.01 significance), yet has no significant correlation withannual growth for the same group. Thus, as a measure of capacity tochange, income per capita has no value. We have presented a number of concepts for development in thispaper, establishing an on­going research agenda. We have demonstratedthe long­standing use of the concept of state capacity and also its manydefinitions and operationalizations. It is clear that further research in thearea requires the establishment of clear theoretical distinctions betweenthe independent and dependent variables related to state capacity andclear distinctions in their measurement. We have also established the idea of capacity utilization and itsrelevance to state capacity research. Industrial economists havedeveloped both theoretical and empirical research related to capacityutilization, and it would only benefit the fields of comparative politicsand development scholars to apply those insights to state capacity. A keycontribution of capacity utilization will be to understand which statesare operating a high capacity and which have yet more resources, in alltheir forms, to devote to services and development for its citizens.
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Capacity utilization will also benefit development scholars by pointingus to states (and sub­state entities) that are “doing more with less.” Thatis, actors that are providing relatively high levels of services and goodswith what limited resources they have, primarily through efficiency. Next, and very much related, we have established the limited value ofGDP/capita as an explanatory variable for state capacity. There is noargument that variations in wealth are related to development outcomes.However, as our initial analyses have shown, the amount of variationexplained by wealth in this group of countries –those that are neither atthe very top of the UN Human Development Index nor at its verybottom– is limited. Wealth of a country per capita can explain 30% ­40% of variation. While we do not want to ignore this, it is clear thatwealth does not explain all of development. We feel strongly thateconomic wealth and growth has its place in the literature, but morefruitful research will focus on the other explanations for variation. Wesuggest here that using regional variation, a proxy for historical context,is one important step forward. We also suggest that sub­nationalresearch is required to further understand the role of the state indevelopment. Critically, the answer to the question, state capacity for
whom? will be answered through this kind of research. We have also introduced the idea of durable capacity. This concept iscritical to understanding the best policies in which a community caninvest. Our basic example of adult literacy in the former Sovietcountries demonstrates that lasting gains can be made in developmentoutcomes regardless of per capita income. Further, these gains are notlost over time despite regime change and income variations. As our main argument at the beginning of the paper is that theconcept of state capacity is muddled, we are hesitant to add to thatmuddle. Nevertheless, we believe that the contributions of this paperwill lead to an opening of the “black box” of the role of the state indevelopment outcomes and more fruitful research into alternatives towealth as the answer to capacity development.
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